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A RIGID NO-EXHAUSTION RULE FOR SECTION 1983
ACTIONS: PATSY V. BOARD OF REGENTS
Federal courts often refuse to grant judicial relief until a complainant ex-
hausts the adequate administrative remedies which are available.' The United
States Supreme Court has described this as a "long settled rule of judicial
administration." 2 Several reasons3 for requiring exhaustion of administrative
remedies prior to judicial determination of a case include conservation of
judicial resources, utilization of expertise gained by administrative law judges,
and a general promotion of the agencies which may provide plaintiffs with
more accessible avenues of relief."
1. See, e.g., Myers v. Bethlehem Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938) ("no one is entitled
to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy
has been exhausted"); Rhodes v. United States, 574 F.2d 1179, 1181 (5th Cir. 1978) (generally,
a plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief from the courts).
See also Public Service Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 247 (1952) (state administrative
bodies have initial right to ... take evidence and make findings of fact); J.P. Stevens Employees
Educ. Comm. v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 326, 328 (4th Cir. 1978) ("it is well established that orders
issued by the [administrative][b]oard ... are not reviewable until termination of the proceedings
and entry of a final order"); Chevron Chemical Co. v. Costle, 443 F. Supp. 1024, 1029 (N.D.
Cal. 1978) (initial decisions by an administrative body may not be "preempted or prejudiced"
by a court's grant of declaratory relief).
2. Myers v. Bethlehem Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50 (1938) (plaintiff's contention that he should
be allowed to prevent an administrative determination of his case, and instead go directly to
the federal district court, was "at war" with the long settled exhaustion requirement). See also
Petersen Baking Co. v. Bryan, 290 U.S. 570, 575-76 (1933) (when there is no suggestion that
plaintiff would have been denied relief by administrative board, exhaustion is required); White
v. Johnson, 282 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1930) (plaintiff must pursue an orderly process of administra-
tion and the court will not ignore plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies); Red
"C" Oil Co. v. North Carolina, 222 U.S. 380, 394 (1911) ("[w]here one complains that regula-
tions promulgated under legislative authority by a state board are unreasonable and oppressive,
he should seek relief by applying to that board to modify them").
3. See, e.g., McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969). In McKart, the Supreme Court
explained that the exhaustion doctrine is commonly applied when a statute provides that ad-
ministrative procedures shall be exclusive. Id. at 193-95. The doctrine also is invoked to avoid
premature interruption of the administrative process. Id. For further discussion of the reasons
for requiring exhaustion, see infra notes 4 & 16-20 and accompanying text.
4. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. at 193-95. For a general discussion of the reasons
for exhaustion, see B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 176 (1976).
Although the exhaustion doctrine is a rule of judicial administration, Congress has found
it appropriate in some areas to require exhaustion statutorily. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a)(1976)
(if agency is allegedly responsible for committing a tort, plaintiff must demand relief from
that agency). See also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(b)-2254(c) (1976) (a writ of habeas corpus shall not
be granted until state court remedies have been exhausted); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976) (pro-
vided the state has an available remedy, plaintiff must file state proceedings and wait for a
period of 60 days before filing suit in federal court under this statute); 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1976)
(agency action must be "final" before it is subject to review by federal courts).
When the exhaustion requirement is statutorily imposed, the discretionary power of the court
is removed, and the complainant must show that no avenues of relief remain open in order
for the court to decide the case. See, e.g., Rose v. Lundy, - U.S. - , 102 S. Ct.
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In a series of cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,1 however, the Supreme
Court consistently refused to require exhaustion of administrative remedies.6
Subsequently, lower federal courts posited divergent interpretations of the
Supreme Court opinions. Some courts concluded that the inadequacies of
the administrative remedies available in these Supreme Court cases had in-
voked traditional exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine.' Other courts,
however, believed the Court had created a rigid no-exhaustion rule for ac-
tions brought under section 1983.8 In Patsy v. Board of Regents," the Supreme
Court clarified its position by holding that section 1983 plaintiffs are not
required to exhaust state administrative remedies before bringing suit in
federal court.'"
Recognizing the differing interpretations given to its prior decisions, the
Court chose not to rest its decision solely on stare decisis. Instead, the Court
studied the legislative histories of section 1983 and of a more recently enacted
statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1997." Because the Supreme Court determined that
the congressional intent behind these statutes precluded an exhaustion re-
1198 (1982) (if a prisoner presents some exhausted and some unexhausted claims in a petition
for writ of habeas corpus, all claims will be dismissed).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. 111 1979) provides, in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordiance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
6. See Barry v. Bachi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973); Carter
v. Stanton, 405 U.S. 669 (1972); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971); Houghton v.
Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); Damico v. California, 389
U.S. 416 (1967); McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
7. Courts traditionally do not require exhaustion of administrative remedies which have
been judicially determined to be inadequate. See infra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
In Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970), the
court studied the cases in which the Supreme Court had failed to require exhaustion, and con-
cluded that each was based on the inadequacy of the available remedy. 421 F.2d at 569. At
the time the Fifth Circuit applied the exhaustion requirement to a § 1983 case in Patsy v.
Florida Int'l Univ., 634 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd, __ U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 2557
(1982), there were four other circuits that did not adhere to a rigid no-exhaustion rule. See
Secret v. Brierton, 584 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1978); Bignall v. North Idaho College, 538 F.2d
243 (9th Cir. 1976); Gonzales v. Shamker, 533 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1976); Raper v. Lucey, 488
F.2d 748 (Ist Cir. 1973).
8. The Third, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits interpreted Supreme Court prece-
dent as establishing a rigid no-exhaustion rule under § 1983. See Clappier v. Flynn, 605 F.2d
519 (10th Cir. 1979); Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 574 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1978);
Green v. Tim Eyck, 572 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir. 1978); Ricketts v. Lightcap, 567 F.2d 1226 (3d
Cir. 1977); Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
9. __ U.S. __ , 102 S. Ct. 2557 (1982).
10. 102 S. Ct. at 2568.
11. See id. at 2561. The recently enacted statute considered by the Court was the Civil
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997a-1997e (Supp. IV 1980). For further
discussion of the statute, see infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
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quirement under section 1983, the Court found it unnessesary to reach a
conclusion about the policy issues involved. 2
In Patsy, however, the Court may have misconstrued congressional intent
concerning exhaustion of administrative remedies. The ambiguous legislative
history of section 1983 reveals no conclusive evidence of whether Congress
desired an exhaustion requirement.' 3 Furthermore, the Court's reliance on
the recently enacted section 1997 is inapposite. Through the enactment of
section 1997, Congress addressed only a narrow class of cases brought under
section 1983 and did not articulate its position concerning whether exhaus-
tion generally should be required."' Additionally, the Patsy decision is in-
consistent with a case decided just six months earlier by the Court, Fair
Assessment in Real Estate v. McNary.'5 The contradictory holdings may
reflect the absence of an established policy rationale upon which actions
brought under section 1983 should be decided.
BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court has recognized the value of requiring exhaustion of
both state and federal administrative remedies.' 6 If the complainant receives
a satisfactory remedy through the administrative process, resort to the court
will be unneccessary, thereby conserving judicial resources.' 7 Also, an ad-
12. The Court explained that because the policy considerations involved do not invariably
point in one direction, legislative policy decisions are preferable. 102 S. Ct. at 2567. Several
Justices, however, did clearly express their personal views concerning the relevant policy issues.
Concurring Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist urged Congress to legislatively adopt an exhaus-
tion requirement for § 1983 actions. Id. at 2568 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In dissent, Justices
Powell and Burger also expressed the belief that exhaustion should be required. Id. at 2579
(Powell, J., dissenting). In a separate concurrence, Justice White was less clear in expressing
his personal views concerning policy. Justice White explained that whether or not the no-
exhaustion rule was initially a wise choice, the question was now stare decisis. Id. at 2569
(White, J., concurring).
13. For a discussion of the legislative history of § 1983 and a criticism of the Patsy Court's
holding that the statute precludes an exhaustion requirement, see infra notes 108-18 and
accompanying text.
14. In concurrence, Justice White expressed the opinion that by relying on the legislative
history of section 1997e, the Court had "unnecessarily and unwisely ventured further to find
support where none may be had." 102 S. Ct. at 2569 (White, J., concurring).
15. 454 U.S. 100 (1981). In Fair Assessment, the Supreme Court refused to exercise jurisdiction
over an action brought under § 1983 and required plaintiffs to exhaust all state remedies. Id.
at 116. For a more extensive discussion of Fair Assessment, see infra notes 141-50 and accom-
panying text.
16. See Public Service Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 247 (1952) ("[sltate ad-
ministrative bodies have the initial right to reduce the general policies of state regulatory statutes
into concrete orders and the primary right to take evidence and make findings of fact"). See
also McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969) (when considering exhaustion of federal
administrative remedies, the Court stated that the exhaustion doctrine is a rule of sound judicial
administration); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938) (the ex-
haustion doctrine is a well-established rule of "judicial administration").
17. McKart, 395 U.S. at 194 (court may never have to intervene if plaintiff successfully
vindicates his rights in administrative process). See generally Comment, Exhaustion of State
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ministrative agency may be well-suited to resolve issues and make findings
of fact because of agency expertise developed in a particular area.'" By allow-
ing an agency to hear the disputes it was established to resolve, a court
will enable the agency to discover and correct its own errors and, therefore,
will discourage litigants from circumventing the administrative process.' 9 Final-
ly, an efficient administrative agency may result in more accessible relief
to complainants."0
Generally, to determine whether exhaustion should be required courts look
to the adequacy of the available remedy." If an agency provides an ap-
propriate and adequate avenue of relief, the court often requires exhaustion.22
Traditional exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine, however, safeguard the
rights of the complainant. For example, if the administrative procedures are
lengthy and do not provide interim relief, exhaustion is not required. 3 Fur-
Administative Remedies in Section 1983 Cases, 41 U. Cm. L. REV. 537 (1973) (resort to the
courts will be less likely if an administrative agency is given an opportunity to correct its own
errors) [hereinafter cited as Exhaustion in Section 1983 Cases].
18. See McKart, 395 U.S. at 194 (an agency should be given the first chance to exercise
its expertise). See also Weinberger v. Bentex Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 412 U.S. 645 (1973). In
Bentex, the Court explained that agencies were often best equipped to perform their limited
functions because of the specialization and insight they gain through experience. Therefore,
the Court concluded, preliminary resort should be to the agency. Id. at 654.
19. In McKart, Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, explained that administrative
agencies are created as independent entities and are vested with various powers and duties.
The autonomous nature of these agencies usually counsels courts against interfering with ad-
ministrative action. Frequent and deliberate circumvention of administrative agencies might weaken
their effectiveness by encouraging people to ignore them. 395 U.S. at 194-95. Accord Wolff
v. Selective Service Board, 372 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir. 1967) (administration should be free
to work out a solution to its own errors, and thus, judicial interference is undesirable).
20. The Supreme Court has explained that "resort to administrative procedures is an ex-
peditious way to settle disputes, conducive to speed and economy." United States v. Grace
& Sons, 384 U.S. 424, 429 (1966). Indeed, Congress believed that requiring exhaustion of ade-
quate administrative grievance procedures established in state prisons would encourage states
to maintain and improve their systems. Consequently, an exhaustion provision was included
in 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (Supp. IV 1980). For further discussion of the legislative intent behind
this statute, see infra notes 133-38 and accompanying text.
21. Exhaustion is not required if an administrative remedy is found inadequate or unavailable.
See United States v. Grace & Sons, 384 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1966). See also United States v.
Holpugh Co., 328 U.S. 234, 240 (1946) (contractor must show administrative remedy is inade-
quate or unavailable to avoid exhausting the remedy).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Blair, 321 U.S. 730, 736-37 (1944) (plaintiff must exhaust
administrative remedies where no evidence that to do so would be futile or prejudicial). Several
Supreme Court cases have held that exhaustion is required when there is no showing that ad-
ministrative remedies are inadequate. See Public Service Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S.
237 (1952); Illinois Commerce Comm'n v. Thomson, 318 U.S. 675 (1943); Natural Gas Pipeline
Co. v. Slattery, 302 U.S. 300 (1937); Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 279 U.S.
159 (1929).
23. In Walker v. Southern Railroad Co., 385 U.S. 196 (1966) (per curiam), for example,
a federal agency established by the Railway Labor Act was designed to arbitrate employment
discharge grievances. Because the agency was severely backlogged, the Court determined that
no exhaustion was required. Id. at 198-99. Cf. Oklahoma Natural Gas v. Russell, 261 U.S.
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thermore, exhaustion is not required if a court considers the administrative
remedy inadequate because the agency involved is not authorized to grant
the requested relief," or if it is clear the agency will reject the claim, mak-
ing resort to the agency futile.2" Exhaustion may even be required when a
constitutional claim is raised;26 however, if an agency or its actions are directly
challenged as unconstitutional, then no exhaustion is required."
These various exceptions are not mechanically applied, and federal courts
maintain wide discretion in determining whether exhaustion is required in
a particular case.2 8 Most importantly, by requiring exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies, a court is not asserting that it has no jurisdiction over
the case; rather, the exhaustion doctrine is concerned with the timing of
judicial review. 9 Therefore, if after exhausting administrative remedies the
290 (1923) (injunctive relief can be granted by federal court to prevent irreparable injury even
if state remedies are not exhausted).
24. See United States v. Grace & Sons, 384 U.S. 424, 430 (1966) (if an administrative of-
ficer clearly lacks the authority to grant relief, the administrative remedy may be considered
"unavailable"); Public Utilities Comm'n of Ohio v. United Fuel Gas Co., 317 U.S. 456, 468
(1943) (because the Federal Power Commission, and not the state agency involved, maintained
exclusive power to provide the remedy requested, no exhaustion of state administrative remedies
required).
25. In United States v. Blair, 321 U.S. 730 (1944), the Court implied that if there is evidence
that an appeal to the agency administrator would be prejudicial or futile, exhaustion should
not be required. Id. at 736. See also United States v. Grace & Sons, 384 U.S. 424, 430 (1966)
(if an administrative officer reveals an unwillingness to comply with proper procedure, the plaintiff
need not exhaust the agency remedy). Cf. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 20.21 (Supp. 1982)
("exhaustion is not required when the question of the adequacy of the remedy is identical
with the merits of the lawsuit") [hereinafter cited as DAVIS].
26. For example, in Allen v. Grand Central Aircraft Co., 347 U.S. 535 (1954), the plaintiff
alleged that the statute involved was unconstitutional. The Court, however, explained that it
would be premature to decide the question of constitutionality before the administrative pro-
dedures had been exhausted. Id. at 553. See also Aircraft & Diesel Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S.
752 (1947) (litigant. cannot circumvent administrative agency by raising constitutional questions).
See generally DAvis, supra note 25, at 281 ("a court will not decide a constitutional question
if there is a possibility an agency may determine the question on nonconstitutional grounds").
27. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (although exhaustion is statutorily re-
quired, the constitutionality of an agency's procedure may be challenged in court before ad-
ministrative remedies are exhausted). See also Fuentes v. Roher, 519 F.2d 379 (2d Cir. 1975)
(discharged school superintendent not required to exhaust administrative remedies before bring-
ing constitutional challenge to hearing board's procedures).
28. Because the exhaustion doctrine is a rule of judicial administration, and because the
exceptions to the doctrine have been judicially established, the courts retain the responsibility
for determining whether exhaustion should be required in any given case. One commentator
has suggested that the Supreme Court should clarify the basis for its decisions concerning ex-
haustion of administrative remedies, rather than maintain the discretion to require exhaustion
as it sees fit. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND GOVERNMENTS 93-94 (1975).
29. When a court determines that exhaustion should be required, it defers exercise of its
jurisdiction until administrative remedies have been exhausted. Justice Brennan, concurring in
Fair Assessment in Real Estate v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981), drew a distinction between
renouncing federal court jurisdiction under § 1983 and simply "deferring" that jurisdiction
until state administrative remedies have been exhausted. Id. at 136 (Brennan, J., concurring).
The opinion suggested that a complete displacement of § 1983 remedies could only be justified
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complainant is dissatisfied with the agency's decision, the claim may then
be pursued in federal court.3 0
Until 1963, courts customarily applied the exhaustion doctrine to cases
brought under section 1983. 31 In McNeese v. Board of Education,32 however,
the Supreme Court held that exhaustion of state administrative remedies was
not required by the statute. The plaintiffs in McNeese were students enrolled
in a racially segregated school.33 The students brought suit under section
1983 requesting equitable relief, including registration in an integrated school.
The state administrative remedy, which provided that residents of the school
district should file complaints with the superintendent, was not exhausted
by the plaintiffs.1
4
In support of its decision that exhaustion of administrative remedies was
not a prerequisite to suit under section 1983, the McNeese Court cited its
earlier decision in Monroe v. Pape." Although Monroe involved only state
by a strong showing of congressional intent or the existence of persuasive policy considera-
tions. Id. The deferral of federal court jurisdiction that results when exhaustion of administrative
remedies is required, Justice Brennan concluded, could be more easily justified. Id.
30. The exhaustion doctrine is based on the assumption that many disputes can be resolved
at the administrative level, thus abolishing the need for federal court intervention. See supra
note 17 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has stated that there are no
res judicata or collateral estoppel effects attached to state administrative decisions. Consequently,
federal courts are free to determine the issues should a plaintiff remain dissatisfied after ex-
hausting administrative remedies. See Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U.S. 210, 230 (1908)
(after exhausting state administrative remedies, plaintiff's subsequent claim in federal court cannot
be defeated by a plea of res judicata). See also Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 274 (1939)
(acknowledging Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line is still good law, but that it does not apply
to state judicial, as opposed to administrative remedies). See generally Developments in the
Law: Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1133, 1272 (1977) (explaining that resort
to federal courts remains open after exhaustion of state administrative remedies because prin-
ciples of res judicata do not attach to agency determination) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
A distinction must be noted, however, when review of federal, rather than state, administrative
decisions is involved. A federal court usually will accept the factual determinations of the federal
administrator, leaving only questions of law open to judicial review. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943) (when Congress places authority in an administrative agency,
that agency's determination of the facts should not be overturned simply because the reviewing
court might have reached a different conclusion).
31. See Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939). In Lane, the Supreme Court recognized that
administrative remedies must normally be exhausted before bringing suit in federal court, but
state judicial remedies need not be exhausted. Id. at 274. Subsequent to the decision in Lane,
lower federal courts generally continued to require exhaustion of administrative remedies in
§ 1983 cases. See, e.g., Dove v. Parham, 282 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1960); Covington v. Edwards,
264 F.2d 780 (4th Cir. 1959); Baron v. O'Sullivan, 258 F.2d 336 (3d Cir. 1958).
32. 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
33. Id. at 669.
34. Id. at 670.
35. Id. at 671 (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961)). In Monroe, a black man
and his family were forced to stand naked in their living room while Chicago police officers
ransacked their home. Mr. Monroe was then taken to police headquarters for 10 hours where
he was not permitted to call his family or lawyer. He was later released, and no charges were
pressed. 365 U.S. at 169. Exhaustion of state judicial remedies was not required even though
the Illinois Constitution contained an unreasonable search and seizure clause similar to that
in the fourth amendment of the federal Constitution. 365 U.S. at 183-84.
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judicial proceedings, rather than administrative remedies, it presented a
thorough discussion of the legislative history of section 1983. The Monroe
Court explained that the statute was originally entitled the Ku Klux Act of
April 20, 1871 and was enacted to vest federal courts with jurisdiction to
enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment.36 Thus, the Court
analyzed the intent of the legislators who originally passed the statute.
In Monroe, the Court recognized that the statute created a procedural
mechanism for redress of constitutional violations committed under color
of state law.37 Three main legislative purposes for granting the federal courts
jurisdiction through section 1983 were identified by the Court.3 8 First, the
statute was designed to give a remedy for any injury suffered as a result
of a state law which is unconstitutional on its face.39 Second, Congress in-
tended to provide a cause of action in the event that a state remedy inade-
quately protects constitutional rights.40 Third, the statute was designed to
create a federal remedy where a state remedy may be adequate in theory,
but not in practice." Premised on these three central purposes of the statute,
the Monroe Court inferred a congressional intent to provide concurrent
forums, which would allow complainants to choose either state or federal
court to effectuate their claims. 2 The majority reasoned that to require ex-
36. 365 U.S. at 171.
37. Id. The Monroe Court recognized the procedural nature of the statute when it con-
sidered the statements made by Senator Edmunds at the time § 1983 originally was passed.
Id. The Senator commented that the "section is one that I believe nobody objects to . ..
it is merely carrying out the principles of the civil rights bill, which has since become part
of the Constitution." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 568 (1871). Federal courts have adhered
to the view that § 1983 creates procedural, rather than substantive rights. See, e.g., Chapman
v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979) ("[sltanding alone, § 1983 clearly
provides no protection for civil rights since ... § 1983 does not provide any substantive rights
at all"); LeBoeuf v. Ramsey, 503 F. Supp. 747, 754 (D.C. Mass. 1980) (§ 1983 is a remedial
provision creating no substantive rights).
38. See 365 U.S. at 173. The Monroe Court inferred these three main purposes from an
examination of the legislative history of § 1983 in its entirety. Id. The Court specifically con-
sidered a letter sent from President Grant to the Congress, which explained the serious state
of affairs existing in the southern states at the time. Id. at 172-73. The President expressed
the belief that the life, liberty, and property of some citizens were not secure, that state authorities
lacked the power to correct the evils, and therefore, that legislation should be passed which
would secure the enforcement of laws in all parts of the United States. See CONG. GLOBE,
42d Cong., 1st Sess. 244 (1871).
39. 365 U.S. at 173. In opposition to the bill, however, Representative Sloss maintained
that its purpose was "unclear" because advocates of the bill did not suggest that any state
had passed an unconstitutional law. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 268 (1871).
40. 365 U.S. at 173. During legislative debate, Senator Sherman alleged that blacks could
not testify against whites in Kentucky, therefore, the state court remedies were inadequate to
protect the constitutional rights of blacks. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist Sess. 345 (1871).
41. 365 U.S. at 174. An example of remedies adequate in theory, but not in practice, can
be seen in southern states that instituted laws against discrimination on the basis of race, but
simply were not powerful enough or did not have the desire to prevent the unconstitutional
actions of the Ku Klux Klan. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 428 (1871) (Represen-
tative Beatty stated that the equal protection of the laws was denied citizens in certain states
because of the states' lack of power or inclination to uphold the Constitution).
42. 365 U.S. at 183. In Monroe, the Court ultimately determined that Congress intended
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haustion of state judicial remedies would defeat the purposes of the statute.4 3
After considering the legislative history of section 1983 as articulated in
Monroe, the McNeese Court discerned that to require a plaintiff bringing
a claim in federal court to "attempt to vindicate the same claim in a state
court" would defeat the purposes of the statute. 4 Exhaustion of state ad-
ministrative remedies was specifically addressed, however, when the McNeese
Court explained that the available remedy was inadequate to protect con-
stitutional rights because the administrative body involved lacked authority
to grant the requested relief.45 The inadequacy of the administrative remedy
provided by the state constituted a traditional exception to the exhaustion
doctrine.4" Therefore, the McNeese opinion concluded that resort to state
administrative proceedings is not necessary when such proceedings offer only
tenuous protection. 4' It remained unclear, however, whether the Court had
established a rigid no-exhaustion rule under section 1983, or simply invoked
a traditional exception to the doctrine.
In several subsequent cases, the Supreme Court disposed of the exhaus-
tion question by simply referring to McNeese. In Damico v. California,'8
for example, the plaintiffs directly challenged the constitutionality of a state
statute. The Court did not recognize that such a challenge constituted a tradi-
tional exception to the exhaustion doctrine.4 9 Instead, the Court issued a
to provide plaintiffs with a federal remedy supplementary to the state remedy. Id. It has been
argued, however, that the Court was incorrect in assuming that the federal courts would pro-
vide a supplemental remedy in all cases. It has been suggested that perhaps Congress wanted
to provide a federal remedy only where the state remedy is inadequate in theory or in practice.
This view of the statute is more consistent with the three main purposes of § 1983 as set forth
in Monroe, which all necessitate a determination of whether the available state remedy is ade-
quate. See Note, Limiting The Section 1983 Action In The Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 HARV.
L. REV. 1486, 1490 (1969) (suggesting that an expansive reading of a supplemental federal remedy
so broadens the scope of § 1983 as to make the section's latter two purposes redundant).
43. 365 U.S. at 183. If the Court had required exhaustion of state judicial remedies, federal
court jurisdiction would have been defeated for all practical purposes because of the res judicata
effect of state court decisions. See supra notes 30-31.
44. McNeese, 373 U.S. at 672.
45. Id. at 674-75 ("it is by no means clear that Illinois law provides petitioners with an
administrative remedy sufficiently adequate to preclude prior resort to a federal court for pro-
tection of their federal rights").
46. Id. at 675. The McNeese Court explained that under state law, petitioners could file
a complaint alleging discrimination only if they first obtained subscription of 50 residents or
10% of the school district. Id. Furthermore, the superintendent did not have the authority to
order corrective action, but could only make a recommendation that the attorney general bring
suit to enjoin further discrimination. Should the Attorney General decide to file suit, the superinten-
dent's findings would not be binding on any court or executive officer. Id. At best, a favorable
decision by the superintendent could lead to a suit in state court. Because a state judicial remedy
need not be exhausted as a prerequisite to suit in federal court, the Court reasoned that it
would be anomalous to hold that this inadequate administrative remedy must be exhausted
before bringing the federal action. Id.
47. Id. at 676.
48. 389 U.S. 416 (1967) (per curiam).
49. For cases holding that no exhaustion is required when the constitutionality of an ad-
ministrative proceeding is directly challenged, see supra note 27.
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one page per curiam opinion summarily concluding that based on McNeese,
the federal district court had improperly dismissed the action for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies.50 One year later, in King v. Smith,5 the
Court disposed of the exhaustion issue in a footnote stating that under sec-
tion 1983, a plaintiff "is not required to exhaust administrative remedies,
where the constitutional challenge is sufficiently substantial, as here, to re-
quire the convening of a three judge court." 5 2 Similarly, in Houghton v.
Shafer," the Court recognized that to require exhaustion of the particular
administrative remedy would be futile. 4 Although the Court made seeming-
ly catagorical statements in each of these cases that section 1983 does not
require exhaustion of administrative remedies, the possible alternative inter-
pretations of each led many commentators and lower federal courts to con-
clude the Supreme Court was not adopting a rigid no-exhaustion rule. 5
Courts that did not interpret the Supreme Court opinions as establishing
a rigid no-exhaustion rule applied the traditional exhaustion doctrine to ac-
tions brought under section 1983.6 Consequently, these courts continued to
50. 389 U.S. at 417 (the Court cited McNeese as controlling without mentioning that in
that case, the available administrative remedy could only be enforced through state judicial
action and, therefore, clearly was inadequate). The cursory consideration the Court gave to
the exhaustion question in Damico led one commentator to remark, "[p]rior to [Damico], the
Supreme Court's treatment of the exhaustion requirement had been inconclusive. [When] the
need for exhaustion was again urged upon the Court in [Damico], it was rejected summarily.
Surprisingly, the question was treated as one governed by settled law." Comment, Exhaustion
of State Remedies Under the Civil Rights Act, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1201, 1201-02 (1968).
51. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
52. Id. at 312 n.4. The King Court did not discuss the adequacy of the available remedy
because plaintiffs directly challenged the constitutionality of the state welfare procedures. Id.
In both Damico and King, it was beyond the authority of the agency involved to award the
remedy requested, thus, the administrative remedies were clearly inadequate. See also Carter
v. Stanton, 405 U.S. 669 (1972) (per curiam) (administrative remedies inadequate, thus, ex-
haustion not required under § 1983).
53. 392 U.S. 639 (1968) (per curiam).
54. Id. at 642.
55. Two additional cases contributed to the position of some courts and commentators that
the Supreme Court did not intend to establish a rigid no-exhaustion rule. In Barry v. Bachi,
443 U.S. 55 (1978), the majority did not impose a rigid no-exhaustion rule, but instead, based
its refusal to require exhaustion on one of the traditional exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine.
Id. at 63 n.10. The Barry Court, quoting Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 575 (1973), ex-
plained that exhaustion is not required if, for all practical purposes, the merits of the lawsuit
are identical to the question of the adequacy of the administrative remedy. 443 U.S. at 63
n.10. For a citation of decisions by the United States Courts of Appeals which did not inter-
pret Supreme Court precedent as creating a rigid no-exhaustion rule, see supra note 7. See
also Developments, supra note 30, at 1274 (in all cases in which the Supreme Court ruled
that no exhaustion was required, the available remedies were inadequate arid exhaustion would
not have been required under the traditional doctrine); Exhaustion in Section 1983 Cases, supra
note 17, at 543 (every case in which the Supreme Court failed to require exhaustion involved
situation in which exhaustion would not have been required under traditional exhaustion prin-
ciples).
56. For a discussion of traditional exhaustion doctrine, see supra notes 16-20 and accom-
panying text.
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consider the adequacy of the administrative remedy available in each case."
This flexible approach to the exhaustion question had been adopted in five
circuits. 8 Because the remaining six circuits adhered to a strict no-exhaustion
rule, however, the Supreme Court reconsidered the exhaustion question in
Patsy v. Board of Regents.59
THE PATSY DECISION
Facts and Procedural History
Georgia Patsy, a white female, was a secretary at Florida International
University." She was denied thirteen promotions for which she applied at
the University, although she contended she was qualified for these positions.
Patsy maintained that the University's practice of segregating applicants' files
on the basis of race and sex resulted in her continuous rejection. 6' By
separating files to facilitate the hiring and promoting of individuals from
minority groups, Patsy alleged that the University engaged in a pattern and
practice of discrimination in violation of the Constitution and laws of the
United States. 2
Patsy filed suit under section 1983 in Federal District Court for the
Southern District of Florida. 3 She requested injunctive and declaratory relief
in the form of a promotion, or in the alternative, the sum of $500,000 as
actual and exemplary damages.' The defendant, Board of Regents, moved
to dismiss the action based on Patsy's failure to exhaust the available ad-
ministrative remedies available at the state level. 65 The district court granted
the defendant's motion.
On appeal, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit reversed and remanded the case. On rehearing, however, the court
of appeals, sitting en banc, vacated the panel's decision.6 6 The full court
determined that although the United States Supreme Court had held in
57. For situations in which a remedy may be determined inadequate, see supra notes 21-27
and accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560, 569 (2d Cir. 1969). In Eisen, the court did
not discern that the Supreme Court had established a rigid no-exhaustion rule under the Civil
Rights Act. Rather, the Eisen court read the Supreme Court decisions as merely condemning
a "wooden" application of the exhaustion doctrine under § 1983. Id. See also supra note 7.
59. __ U.S. __ , 102 S. Ct. 2557 (1982).
60. Patsy v. Florida Int'l Univ., 634 F.2d 900, 902 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 2557
(1982).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 102 S. Ct. 2557, 2559 (1982).
64. Id.
65. 634 F.2d 900, 913-14 (1981). According to the Board of Regents, the State University
System provided several administrative avenues of relief, none of which were pursued by the
plaintiff. The administrative remedies, however, were not considered in detail because the plaintiff
did not challenge the adequacy of the available remedies. Rather, plaintiff contended exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies is never required under § 1983. Id.
66. Id.
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previous cases that exhaustion was not required under section 1983, prior
holdings did not preclude the adoption of a flexible exhaustion rule.67 Subse-
quently, the United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court
of appeals."
The Court's Rationale
The Patsy Court held that exhaustion of state administrative remedies could
not be required as a prerequisite to bringing an action in federal court pur-
suant to section 1983.69 Although the Court based its decision on the
legislative histories of both section 1983 and section 1997e, prior case law
briefly was considered. The Court acknowledged that many of its prior deci-
sions could have been based on the traditional exceptions to the exhaustion
doctrine,"0 however, the Court engaged in no detailed discussion of prece-
dent. Rather, articulating its position that Congress has vested federal courts
with the paramount duty to protect constitutional rights, the Court explain-
ed that no exhaustion of state remedies is required. According to the Patsy
majority, the Court had not deviated from this postion since its decision
in McNeese.7"
The Court acknowledged that an exhaustion requirement may be imposed
judicially in cases where Congress has not explicitly required exhaustion. 2
When the Court judicially requires exhaustion of administrative remedies,
it defers the jurisdiction granted to it by Congress. 3 Therefore, although
the Court plays an important role in determining whether exhaustion should
be imposed, the Patsy Court declared that the Court should not defer its
jurisdiction unless to do so would be consistent with congressional intent.7 4
Prefacing its discussion of the congressional intent behind section 1983,
the Court explained that the Congress in 1871 did not expressly contemplate
the exhaustion of administrative remedies.7 5 Rather, because federal courts
67. Id. at 908. The court of appeals also set out minimum conditions which must be met
before exhaustion could be required. To be considered adequate, an administrative remedy must
provide for: interim relief in cases where it is necessary to prevent irreparable injury, relief
which is commensurate with the claim, an orderly system of review including relief within a
reasonable time, and fair procedures which are not unduly burdensome and which are not
used to harass complainants. Id. at 912-13.
68. 102 S. Ct. at 2559.
70. Id. at 2560.
71. Id. The Court quoted from Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974), where it had
stated that exhaustion is not a prerequisite to suit under § 1983. Id. at 2560. Because Steffel
considered whether declaratory relief is precluded when a state prosecution has been threatened
but is not pending, however, the language quoted is merely dictum.
72. 102 S. Ct. at 2560-61.
73. Id. at 2561 n.4 ("the role of the state agency becomes important once a court finds
that deferring its jurisdiction is consistent with congressional intent"). For a more detailed
explanation of why the exhaustion requirement can be characterized as a temporary deferral
of jurisdiction, see supra note 29.
74. 102 S. Ct. at 2561.
75. Id. The Court explained that the precursor to § 1983 was § I of the Civil Rights Act
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stand as the prime guarantors of federal rights, the Court found that Con-
gress had intended to provide complainants with an immediate federal remedy
when their constitutional rights alledgedly were violated.76 The majority ex-
plained that Congress enacted section 1983, in part, as a result of the
legislators' distrust in the states' abilities to protect constitutional rights. More
specifically, the fact-finding processes of the state courts were inadequate
because such courts were susceptible to prejudice." Finally, the Court
explained, as it had in Monroe v. Pape, that section 1983 has been inter-
preted to provide dual or concurrent jurisdiction in the state and federal
courts.78
After discussing the debates over passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 79
the predecessor to section 1983, the Court recognized that it would be
"somewhat precarious" to render its decision concerning exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies premised soley on this legislative history. When the
Civil Rights statute was passed in 1871, administrative agencies had not
developed to the extent of present day agencies, and the Reconstruction Con-
gress was not aware of the role these agencies would assume one hundred
years in the future.8" Thus, the Patsy Court sought further support for its
decision by examining a more recent expression of congressional intent.
In 1980, Congress enacted the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons
Act. 8 This statute vests the United States Attorney General with the authority
to uphold the rights of institutionalized persons by granting him standing
to sue on their behalf.2 Section 1997e of the Act, however, requires that
of 1871. Although the 1871 Congress did not specifically contemplate whether exhaustion should
be required, the Patsy Court believed that the "tenor" of the debates could be studied to reveal
congressional intent. 102 S. Ct. at 2561.
76. Id. The Court quoted Representative Dawes as expressing the view that there is no
tribunal better fitted to adjudicate the rights, privileges, and immunities which are granted by
the Constitution, than the courts of the United States. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess.
476 (1871).
77. 102 S. Ct. at 2563. The Court maintained that although deference is often given to
the superior fact-finding ability of an administrative agency, the suspicion that the 1871 Con-
gress felt for the juries and state courts of the time indicated exhaustion should not be re-
quired. Id.
78. Id.
79. See Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1976 & Supp. 111 1979)). Section 1983 remains virtually unchanged from the original Act.
See supra note 5.
80. 102 S. Ct. at 2563-64. Although the 1871 Congress had not considered the exhaustion
question, the Patsy Court concluded that "it seems fair to infer that the 1871 Congress did
not intend that an individual be compelled in every case to exhaust state administrative remedies
before filing an action under § 1 of the Civil Rights Act." Id. at 2563.
81. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997a-1997e (Supp. IV 1980).
82. Section 1997a provides:
Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that any State
• . or other person acting on behalf of a State . . . is subjecting persons residing
in or confined to an institution . . . to flagrant conditions which deprive such per-
sons of any rights, privileges or immunities secured or protected by the Constitu-
tion or laws of the United States causing such persons to suffer grievous harm,
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before the Attorney General may sue on behalf of adult prisoners bringing
civil .rights actions under section 1983, state administrative remedies must
be exhausted in certain limited circumstances.8"
The legislative history of section 1997e reveals Congress' recognition that
the Court generally has not required exhaustion of state administrative
remedies under section 1983.4 Therefore, the Patsy Court concluded that
by expressly adopting an exhaustion provision in section 1997e, Congress
intended to carve out a narrow exception to the Court's no-exhaustion rule.8"
Because Congress, after recognizing that the Court did not require exhaus-
tion under section 1983, had adopted a specific exhaustion requirement in
the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, the Court inferred con-
gressional approval of the general no-exhaustion rule. 6 The Court main-
tained that it would be inconsistent with the intent of Congress to allow
judicial imposition of an exhaustion requirement in a section* 1983 case. 7
In other words, the specific exhaustion provisions of section 1997e would
be superfluous if the judiciary possessed the discretion to require exhaustion
in any case.
After concluding that Congress did not intend that federal courts require
exhaustion before hearing section 1983 cases, the Patsy Court discussed the
policy arguments relied on by the lower court.88 Even if policy considera-
tions indicated the exhaustion doctrine should be applied, the Court rea-
soned that difficult issues concerning when and how to require the exhaus-
tion would arise.8 9 Congress, the Patsy Court proclaimed, possesses superior
... the Attorney General, for or in the name of the United States, may institute
a civil action in any appropriate United States district :ourt ...
Id. § 1997a.
83. Id. § 1997e. The specific provisions of the exhaustion scheme of § 1997e require the
Attorney General to develop standards which will facilitate the states' development of adequate
agencies. If a state believes that it has developed an adequate administrative agency, it may
request that the Attorney General approve the state system by granting it certification. If cer-
tification is granted, a court should require exhaustion of the state administrative remedy unless
the court determines that exhaustion would not be "apprgpriate in the interest of justice." Id.
84. For example, during the debates on § 1997, Representative Wiggins stated: "it is settled
law that an exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required as a precondition of main-
taining a 1983 action." 124 CoNG. REC. 23, 180 (1978).
85. 102 S. Ct. at 2564. The Court states that "Congress understood that exhaustion is not
generally required in section 1983 actions, and that it decided to carve out only a narrow ex-
ception to this rule." Id.
86. Id. at 2565.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 2566. The Patsy Court considered the Fifth Circuit's contention that conserva-
tion of judicial resources and utilization of agency expertise are important concerns in the con-
text of § 1983. The Court noted that additional policy considerations exist when state, rather
than federal agencies are involved. The goal of comity and federal-state relations might be
improved if a federal court were to defer.its review until the state agency had an opportunity
to hear the complaint. Id.
89. Id. at 2567. Questions that would have to be resolved include how to unify standards
for determining whether a certain state agency's remedy is adequate, how the statute of limita-
tions should be applied, and whether there would be any collateral estoppel effect of administrative
findings. Id.
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institutional competence to resolve these problems; consequently, the Court
was not in a postition to suggest that Congress adopt exhaustion schemes
for all section 1983 cases.9 Thus, the Court resolved that the "exhaustion
of state administrative remedies should not be required as a prerequisite to
bringing an action pursuant to section 1983. ' '9
CRITICISM
In Patsy, the Court summarily discussed precedent. The Court disposed
of the argument that it had not given the exhaustion question full considera-
tion in prior cases by stating "Itlhis contention need not detain us long." 91
The Court then merely cited the cases in which it had not required exhaus-
tion of state administrative remedies.93 No critical consideration of the reason-
ing set forth in these opinions was attempted. An examination of the cases
relied on by the Court, however, reveals that those cases had not given
plenary consideration to the propriety of requiring exhaustion under section
1983.
The Patsy Court's list of precedent began with McNeese.9' In McNeese,
the only discussion concerning exhaustion of administrative remedies focused
on the inadequacy of the particular remedy available to the plaintiffs." In-
adequate administrative remedies need never be exhausted, however, even
under the traditional exhaustion doctrine. 9 Although the Court had previously
stated the reasons for refusing to require exhaustion of state judicial
remedies,9 7 the McNeese Court failed to recognize the distinction between
requiring exhaustion of state administrative as opposed to judicial remedies.9
In cases decided after McNeese, the Supreme Court continued to blur the
distinctions between requiring exhaustion of state administrative and judicial
remedies. Rather than engaging in a discussion concerning whether the ex-
90. Id. at 2567-68.
91. Id. at 2568.
92. Id. at 2560.
93. For a citation of these cases, see supra note 6.
94. 102 S. Ct. at 2560. For a discussion of subsequent cases which relied on McNeese,
see supra text accompanying notes 48-55.
95. 373 U.S. 668, 674-76 (1963). If the McNeese Court had intended to follow a rigid no-
exhaustion rule, its thorough discussion of the inadequacy of the available remedy was
superfluous. The concluding statement in McNeese-that when federal rights are subjected to
tenuous protection no exhaustion is required-indicates that the Court considered the inade-
quacy of the remedy relevant to its decision.
96. For a discussion of cases in which courts have found the available remedies inadequate
and not required exhaustion, see supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
97. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 167 (1961).
98. Prior to McNeese, the distinction between requiring exhaustion of state administrative,
as opposed to state judicial remedies was well defined. See supra note 31 and accompanying
text. Discussion of the distinction, however, was conspicuously absent from McNeese.
Even after McNeese, the Supreme Court made it clear that exhaustion of state administrative
proceedings must not be confused with exhaustion of state judicial remedies, as required by
the abstention doctrine. See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 574 n.13 (1973).
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haustion of administrative remedies should be required as a general rule,
the Court simply relied on the inadequacy of the administrative remedy
involved. 9 These cases failed to articulate that requiring exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies differs from exhaustion of judicial remedies in that
no res judicata effect attaches to an agency decision, and thus, an agency
decision constitutes only a temporary deferral of jurisdiction.' 0
Additionally, the Court has refused to recognize that the traditional reasons
federal courts developed the administrative exhaustion doctrine apply in the
context of section 1983 actions. State governments have an interest in the
efficient administration of their governmental structures."' Indeed, the
Supreme Court has recognized that the autonomous nature of state ad-
ministrative agencies may contribute to their abilities to discover and correct
their own errors.' 2 By developing systems designed to cope with specific
administrative concerns, states may benefit from the expertise gained by of-
ficials and develop a heightened sensitivity to protecting federal rights.' 3
Furthermore, the exhaustion doctrine provides for immediate judicial con-
sideration of a case when administrative remedies are inadequate or
unavailable.' 4
99. For example, in Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973), the plaintiff was directly
challenging the constitutionality of the administrative remedy which he was afforded. Id. at
575. In explaining that there was no requirement to exhaust a remedy directly challenged as
inadequate, the Court stated that the question remained open as to whether § 1983 plaintiffs
could ever be required to exhaust administrative remedies. Id. at 574. The Court explained
that certain state administrative remedies had been deemed inadequate on a variety of grounds,
including delay by the agency and doubt as to whether the agency was empowered to grant
effective relief. Id. at 574 n.14. Justice Marshall, realizing the significance of the majority's
implication, wrote a one paragraph concurrence. He joined the Court's opinion "except in-
sofar as it suggests that the question remains open whether plaintiffs in some suits brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may have to exhaust administrative remedies." Id. at 581 (Marshall,
J., concurring). See also supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
101. See generally Comment, Exhaustion of State Remedies Under The Civil Rights Act,
68 COLUM. L. REV. 1201, 1206 (1968) (there is a strong state interest in the establishment of
comprehensive schemes of regulation, and perhaps more importantly, in providing a means
by which the victim of official misconduct can obtain relief without putting the state to the
expense and effort of a trial in federal court).
102. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
104. Inherent in the characterization of the exhaustion doctrine as a "flexible" rule of judicial
administration, is the important concept that the court retains the power to determine, in the
first instance, whether the available administrative remedy is adequate and to refuse to require
exhaustion if it is not. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
Although the state may have an important interest in seeing that the adequate administrative
remedies it provides are utilized by plaintiffs, one commentator has argued that the state's
interest in having its judicial remedies exhausted is negligible. See Exhaustion In Section 1983
Cases, supra note 17, at 547 n.54. Theoretically, state and federal judicial remedies are inter-
changeable. Thus, federal law will be applied, and the state will be forced to spend time and
money defending itself in a judicial proceeding regardless of whether the judicial forum is state
or federal. Furthermore, plaintiffs have a strong interest in bypassing state judicial remedies
which may have res judicata effect in a subsequent federal proceeding. Id.
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Despite these crucial distinctions between requiring exhaustion of state ad-
ministrative and state judicial remedies, the Patsy Court, without a critical
examination, presumed that a rigid no-exhaustion rule had been established
in prior cases. The Court indicated that it would be forced to overrule these
prior decisions if it were to impose the traditional exhaustion doctrine in
a section 1983 action.' 3 If the Patsy Court had engaged in a critical analysis
of precedent, it could have reached the conclusion that its earlier decisions
were based on traditional exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine and not on
a rigid no-exhaustion rule.' 6 Such an analysis would have preserved section
1983 protection for plaintiffs in the event that no adequate administrative
remedies were available, yet permitted federal courts to defer hearing cases
when adequate and appropriate state agencies were available."'
Rather than conducting a detailed analysis of precedent, the majority in
Patsy engaged in an extensive reconsideration of the legislative history of
section 1983. In its discussion of the statute, the Court relied on compelling
statements made by supporters and opponents of the Civil Rights Act of
1871. The Court recognized that Congress placed the utmost faith in the
federal judiciary's ability to guard constitutional rights. "' Therefore, the Patsy
Court deduced that in passing the Civil Rights Act, the Forty-second Con-
gress vested jurisdiction in the federal courts to redress violations of the
fourteenth amendment.' 09
For reasons of sound judicial administration, however, the federal courts
may defer consideration of questions over which they clearly have
jurisdiction.'"' In fact, the exhaustion doctrine is often judicially imposed. '''
105. 102 S. Ct. at 2560. Although the Court did reconsider legislative history in Patsy, the
Court's partial reliance on stare decisis may have more significance than initially seems ap-
parent. To justify overruling its earlier decisions, a particularly strong showing that the Court
previously misconstrued legislative intent may have been necessary. See Patsy v. Board of Regents,
102 S. Ct. 2557, 2569 (1982) (White, J., concurring).
106. For citations to authorities that placed this interpretation on Supreme Court cases, see
supra note 55 and accompanying text.
107. For reasons underlying the exhaustion doctrine and methods by which the traditional
exceptions to the doctrine secure plaintiffs' rights, see supra notes 16-27 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
109. 102 S. Ct. at 2563. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
110. 102 S. Ct. at 2560-61. The Court acknowledged this fact by stating that it "may impose
[an exhaustion] requirement even where Congress has not expressly so provided." Id. Courts
often defer jurisdiction granted to them by Congress. See supra text accompanying notes 16-20.
For example, as early as 1904, the Court in United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161 (1904),
held that plaintiffs must exhaust administrative remedies, stating that "even fundamental ques-
tions must be determined in an orderly way." 194 U.S. at 168. The judicially imposed exhaus-
tion requirement invoked in Sing Tuck was subsequently adopted by statute. See 8 U.S.C §
l 105a(c) (1976). For a further discussion of judicially imposed exhaustion, see B. SCHWARTZ,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 499 (1976).
111. Even under § 1983, the federal courts have, on occasion, chosen not to exercise jurisdiction
when important state interests are involved. See, e.g., Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977)
(Younger principles of comity extended to civil matters); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)
(to enjoin a pending state court proceeding would be a serious interference with state court
prerogatives). Cf. Preiser v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973) (prisoner not permitted to bring
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Consequently, although the Patsy Court's recognition that the federal court
has jurisdiction over actions brought under section 1983 is correct, it is not
determinitive of whether the court should temporarily defer that jurisdic-
tion.
The Court further perceived that Congress had concluded that the federal
courts were more capable of protecting constitutional rights than state
authorities and local courts." 2 Undoubtedly, members of Congress believed
that state courts may be more susceptible to local prejudice which could
result in defective fact-finding processes.'' 3 This belief, however, does not
necessarily argue against requiring exhaustion of state administrative remedies
which have been determined by the judiciary to be adequate. Because state
administrative findings would not be binding on a federal court,'" the federal
court would be free to make its own determination should a plaintiff re-
main dissatisfied with the state agency's decision.
After recognizing that Congress displayed great trust in the federal
judiciary, and that Congress did not consider the exhaustion issue directly,
the Patsy Court ironically interpreted section 1983 as restricting judicial power
to require exhaustion. There are some indications, however, that the legisla-
ture would not have disapproved of a flexible exhaustion requirement. For
example, the very language quoted in Patsy to support the rigid no-exhaustion
rule could have been interpreted differently. When introducing the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, Senator Edmunds stated that Congress had the duty "to secure
to the individual, in spite of the State, or with its aid, as the case might
be, precisely the rights that the Constitution gave him. . -"I Inherent in
the Senator's remarks was a congressional understanding that states could
aid in securing constitutional rights. Given this understanding, the Patsy Court
reasonably could have held that Congress did not intend to advocate circumven-
tion of adequate state administrative remedies which subsequently might be
developed.
Furthermore, the Patsy Court could have interpreted the language em-
an action under § 1983 for unconstitutional denial of good time credits; instead, must first
use habeas corpus and exhaust all state remedies).
112. 102 S. Ct. at 2562.
113. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. Although Congress expressed deep concern
about state prejudice which was apparent immediately after the Civil War, arguably, this con-
cern is not as justified today. Nevertheless, it was the Reconstruction Congress' fear of state
prejudice upon which the Patsy Court relied in construing § 1983 to be an exception to the
exhaustion doctrine.
114. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
115. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 692 (1871)(emphasis added). Senator Edmunds referred
to the Supreme Court decision in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). In that
decision, the Court held that the Constitution, as it was in 1842, required that slaves escaping
from service must "be delivered up, on claim of the person to whom such service or labour
may by due." Id. at 611. Therefore, the Court maintained that it was the duty of Congress
-to secure a slave owner's constitutional right to his "property". Id. This case was cited by
Senator Edmunds to explain that Congress had the duty to pass legislation which secured con-
stitutional rights. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist Sess. at 692.
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bodied in section 1983 as consistent with a flexible exhaustion doctrine. The
statute provides for redress in an action at law, suit in equity, "or other
proper proceeding for redress."'' 6 Implicitly, the language suggests that Con-
gress percieved that some proceeding may be determined adequate other than
a suit originating in federal court. Indeed, the express wording of the statute
is consistent with allowing a judicial determination of the adequacy of state
administrative proceedings. ' " Nevertheless, after considering the legislative
history of the Civil Rights Act, the Court conceded that there is no evidence
which conclusively determines how the Forty-second Congress would have
resolved the question of exhaustion of administrative agencies. ' In 1871,
Congress obviously could not predict the significant role that administrative
agencies would assume in the modern day legal system. As a result, the Court
relied on the perceived intent of the Ninety-sixth Congress in its enactment
of section 1997.
Section 1997 enables the United States Attorney General to bring civil rights
actions on behalf of institutionalized persons." 9 Through the provisions of
section 1997e, Congress instructed that before a section 1983 action may
be instituted by the Attorney General on behalf of adult prisoners, exhaus-
tion of adequate state administrative remedies is required. 2 ° In passing this
narrow requirement, Congress did not consider the wisdom of an exhaus-
tion rule for other section 1983 suits.' 2 ' Nonetheless, the majority in Patsy
considered it appropriate to rely on the legislative history of this new statute
to ascertain whether section 1983 required exhaustion of state remedies. The
Patsy Court erroneously concluded that Congress would not approve of the
traditional exhaustion doctrine in section 1983 actions, simply because it
statutorily imposed a specific exhaustion requirement in section 1997e.' 22
116. For text of statute, see supra note 5.
117. In Patsy, the Board of Regents argued that the flexible exhaustion rule was proper
according to the express language of § 1983. Brief for Respondent at 22-24, Patsy v. Board
of Regents, 102 S. Ct. 2557 (1982).
118. 102 S. Ct. at 2563-64.
119. For further explanation of this statute, see supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 1997a (Supp. IV 1980). Congress authorized the Attorney General to establish
minimum standards which must be met before a state agency could be certified, and therefore
be considered "adequate". If the state administrative system has not been certified by the Attorney
General, the federal court would determine the adequacy of the agency's remedy. H.R. REP.
No. 80, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1979).
121. See supra note 14. In his dissent, Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger, argued
that the majority improperly relied on § 1997e because the legislation addressed such a narrow
class of cases. 102 S. Ct. at 2578 (Powell, J., dissenting).
122. The Patsy majority believed that the exhaustion requirement of § 1997e, which applies
only to adult prisoners bringing actions under § 1983, would be superfluous if the court could
impose exhaustion judicially. 102 S. Ct. at 2566. A close examination of the legislative history,
however, demonstrates that Congress did not intend to restrict the Court's ability to require
exhaustion. For example, if the Attorney General grants any state agency a certification, and
subsequently determines that the agency does not comply with minimum standards, the statute.
commmands him to revoke the certification. During legislative debate, however, it was stated
that even if the Attorney General revokes certification of a system, a federal court remains
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After considering the legislative history of section 1997e, the Patsy Court
proclaimed that if Congress were to determine that an exhaustion require-
ment was appropriate in all section 1983 cases, such a requirement could
be instituted legislatively.' 23 The majority explained that Congress possessed
superior institutional competence to make such policy decisions.' 24 Relying
on this competence, the Court declined to alter what it perceived as a pro-
cedural framework established by Congress for bringing actions under sec-
tion 1983.125
The flaw in the majority's position lies in its characterization of how the
rigid no-exhaustion rule originally was established in section 1983 cases.
During the debates preceeding the passage of section 1997e, Congress con-
tinually referred to the no-exhaustion rule as if the Supreme Court, not the
legislature, had established the rule. For example, one witness testifying before
Congress, explained that the Court generally had not required exhaustion
under section 1983,126 and thus, congressional imposition of an exhaustion
rule in section 1997e would "seem inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
positions.""'2 Similarly, Representative Drinan stated that "the Supreme Court
free to make its own determination that the agency is adequate. 124 CONG. REC. 23,180 (daily
ed. July 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
123. 102 S. Ct. 2567. The Court is correct, of course, that an exhaustion requirement could
be legislatively adopted just as it was under § 1997e. Nevertheless, simply because the legislature
has been silent with respect to exhaustion under § 1983 generally, the Court should not have
assumed that the legislature would approve of a rigid no-exhaustion rule. This argument is
strengthened when one considers the number of times Congress has been asked specifically
to consider a § 1983 exhaustion requirement. Several bills have been introduced into Congress
which would prevent courts from requiring exhaustion under § 1983. For instance, as late as
Nov. 6, 1979, Senator Mathias introduced a bill which provided "that the doctrine of exhaus-
tion of State judicial and administrative remedies [is] inapplicable in section 1983 suits." S.
1983, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 15,991-96 (1979). This bill died in committee,
as did several similar bills which had been previously introduced. For similar proposals, see
H.R. 7520, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 10,834 (1977); H.R. 5535, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 8743 (1977); S. 35, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 554
(1977); H.R. 549, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 356 (1977). In short, Congress has
failed to either legislatively require or prevent exhaustion under § 1983.
124. 102 S. Ct. at 2567. In explaining why the policy decisions involved are so difficult
to make, the Court stated that there is disagreement over whether judicial or administrative
remedies offer the swiftest, least costly, and most reliable relief. Also, the Court questioned
whether the expertise of administrative judges in a given area is as important as the federal
courts' expertise when considering constitutional questions. Id.
It must be noted that these considerations are not new. The same questions must be asked
each time the federal court determines whether to require exhaustion of an administrative remedy
in areas other than § 1983. Yet, the Court does require exhaustion in these areas where Con-
gress has not required it statutorily. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
125. 102 S. Ct. at 2568.
126. See Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons: Hearings on H.R. 2439 and H.R. 5791
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 69 (1977) (statement of Jay Lawrence Lichtman,
Esq., Deputy Director, Defender Division National Legal Aid and Defender Association)
[hereinafter cited as 1977 Hearings].
127. Id. at 77. After discussing McNeese, Mr. Lichtman qualified his statements by explain-
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has consistently refused to . . . require exhaustion of remedies.''' 28
Nonetheless, Congress chose to include an exhaustion provision in the new
legislation. The very fact that during debates Congress found it necessary
to determine whether exhaustion is judicially required under section 1983,
casts doubt on the Court's characterization of the no-exhaustion rule as part
of a procedural framework established by Congress.'29
During the debates over passage of section 1997e, legislators and experts
cited the Court's opinion in McNeese to demonstrate that exhaustion is not
necessarily required under section 1983. '30 While Congress relied on earlier
opinions of the Supreme Court to determine whether exhaustion was required,
the Court in Patsy circuitously relied on the perceived congressional intent
underlying the new statute. By intimating that Congress previously had de-
cided the exhaustion issue, the Court averted a judicial policy determination.
The Court's assertion in Patsy that Congress intended a rigid no-exhaustion
rule under section 1983, seems anomolous when considering the Court's fur-
ther perception that the debates over section 1997e demonstrated vehement
congressional disagreement about whether exhaustion should be required.' 3'
In fact, explicit adoption of an exhaustion requirement under section 1997e
may be construed as evidence that Congress approves of requiring exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies under section 1983. As the Patsy Court
recognized, the legislative history of section 1997e exemplifies that Congress
was aware of the Supreme Court's general refusal to require exhaustion.'32
Yet, in adopting section 1997e, Congress posited that an exhaustion require-
ment would have several beneficial results.
First, legislators believed that undesirable conditions in a particular in-
stitution could be corrected by state agencies without the necessity of a
lawsuit.'33 By requiring exhaustion of state administrative remedies, many
disputes could be resolved quickly at the state level where they arose, rather
ing that one Supreme Court opinion had required exhaustion in an action filed under § 1983;
however, because the plaintiff had challenged the duration of his confinement, the Court could
be interpreted as merely applying the exhaustion requirement of habeas corpus. Id. See Preiser
v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
128. See 1977 Hearings, supra note 126, at 272 (statement of Rep. Drinan). During the hear-
ings, Representative Kastenmeier explained that "the Supreme Court has held, that in 1983
civil rights suits the litigant need not necessarily fully exhaust state remedies." Id. at 57-58
(emphasis added) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
129. Interestingly, before the passage of § 1977e, Georgia Patsy's counsel had argued as
amicus curiae that it would be improper for Congress to impose an exhaustion requirement
in the statute because the Supreme Court had already decided that no exhaustion should be
required. Brief for Respondent at 61 n.26, Patsy v. Board of Regents, 102 S. Ct. 2557 (1982).
130. See 1977 Hearings, supra note 126, at 47, 77.
131. 102 S. Ct. at 2566.
132. See supra notes 84, 126 & 128 and accompanying text.
133. See 124 CoNC. REC. 23,176 (1978). Representative Kastetneier explained that "[tihe
purpose is, in fact, to get these matters resolved at the administrative level, and not to bring
1983 petitioners to the Federal Court to make a Federal Case out of them, if it is unnecessary."
Id. (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
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than in federal court.' 34 Thus, an exhaustion requirement would preserve
judicial resources and result in efficient dispute resolution. Second, the ex-
haustion requirement of section 1997e was based on the legislators' belief
that the states could develop adequate grievance procedures.'3 5 Congress
discussed the effective systems and procedures already developed by some
states.' 6 The legislators reasoned that if complainants were required to ex-
haust adequate remedies, states would be encouraged to develop and im-
prove administrative systems.' 37 Finally, Congress maintained that by requiring
exhaustion, the expertise of state officials would increase.'38
After considering the merits of administrative remedies extensively, Con-
gress determined that the interest in promoting state agencies was strong
enough to justify requiring exhaustion under section 1997e. Therefore, the
Patsy Court may have been wrong to assume Congress would disapprove
of an exhaustion requirement in other section 1983 actions. Given the am-
biguous legislative histories of section 1997e and section 1983, and the fact
that the exhaustion doctrine is a rule of judicial administration, a more
justifiable decision would have been reached if the Patsy Court had deter-
mined the policy issues involved in requiring exhaustion. "
COMPARISON AND IMPACT
Defects in the Patsy decision become particularly obvious when the case
134. See 124 CONG. REC. 23,179 (1978) (statement of Rep. Butler) (if states had grievance
procedures and prisoners were required to utilize those procedures, a great majority of § 1983
cases would be resolved at the administrative level rather than in federal court). Legislators
expressed concern over the tremendous number of § 1983 suits filed in the federal courts each
year. Because nearly 95o of these cases are dismissed by the judiciary as "frivolous," Represen-
tative Sawyer was prompted to state that "as we all know, today the Federal district courts,
with all due respect, give rather short shrift to these 1983 [actions]." Civil Rights of Institu-
tionalized: Hearings on H.R. 10 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Ad-
ministration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1979).
See 124 CONG. REC. 23,179 (1978). It was hoped that by requiring exhaustion of adequate
state grievance procedures, many of the frivolous suits would be resolved at the administrative
level, thereby enabling the courts to give closer consideration to the cases brought before them.
This, in turn, would have the effect of benefitting those plaintiffs with legitimate claims. 124
CONG. REC. 23,179 (1978).
135. Congress also believed that once these administrative systems were in effect, they could
be "more helpful ...than a full blown lawsuit under section 1983." 124 CONG. REC. 11,976
(daily ed. May 1, 1978) (statement of Rep. Railsback).
136. See H.R. REP. No. 80, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1979). Legislators acknowledged that
many state and local officials "have developed high quality grievance resolution systems." Id.
Therefore, Congress instructed the Attorney General to consult state and local officials before
establishing standards which could be followed by all states developing grievance systems. Id.
137. Id. See 1977 Hearings, supra note 126, at 34. When the bill was first introduced, Con-
gress was advised that many states did not have grievance procedures because the states did
not want to spend time and effort to establish systems that might be easily circumvented. Con-
gress reasoned, therefore, that if exhaustion of adequate agency remedies was required, states
would be encouraged to develop grievance procedures. Id.
138. H.R. REP. No. 80, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 23 (1979).
139. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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is compared with a Supreme Court decision rendered just six months prior
to Patsy, Fair Assessment in Real Estate v. McNary.14 0 In Fair Assess-
ment, the Court refused to exercise jurisdiction over a section 1983 suit in-
stituted to recover damages resulting from the unconstitutional collection of
taxes."' After discussing the important and sensitive nature of state tax
systems, the Court explained that the principle of comity precluded federal
court consideration of the case.'4 2 The result of the decision in Fair Assess-
ment requires taxpayers to exhaust state remedies, whether judicial or ad-
ministrative in nature, before pursuing an action in federal court.'43 Conse-
quently, federal court review may be limited drastically by the doctrine of
res judicata." 4
In contrast, the result of the decision in Patsy prevents courts from re-
quiring exhaustion of adequate administrative remedies, even though state
administrative findings are not binding on federal courts. In both Patsy and
Fair Assessment, a strict rule was established by the Supreme Court. The
Patsy Court determined that no exhaustion can be required in section 1983
actions, while the Fair Assessment Court determined that it cannot exercise
jurisdiction over a taxpayer suit brought under section 1983.'4' Neither case
involved a judicial assessment of the adequacy of the available state
remedies.'" The Court in Fair Assessment assumed that the possiblity of
United States Supreme Court review of state decisions would protect the
taxpayers' federal interests. Conversely, the Patsy Court maintained that
140. 454 U.S. 100 (1981).
141. Id. at 102.
142. Id. at 116. In Fair Assessment, the state had argued that the Tax Injunction Act prevented
the suit in federal court. The Court, however, recognized that the Tax Injunction Act was
not controlling because the plaintiff had requested damages and not an injunction. Id. at 107.
Although four justices concurred with the majority decision that plaintiffs should not be
able to bring their claims directly into federal court, these concurring justices based their deci-
sion on the plaintiffs' failure to exhaust state administrative remedies. Id. at 138 (Brennan,
J., concurring). If this view were adopted, the Court would only defer its decision of the case
until after the plaintiffs attempted to recover from the state. See supra note 29. The concurring
justices maintained that although this was an action brought under § 1983, exhaustion was
appropriate because in passing the Tax Injunction Act, Congress had demonstrated its intent
to require deference to states' taxation systems. 454 U.S. at 137 (Brennan, J., concurring).
143. See 454 U.S. at 116. The majority explained that plaintiffs are not left without a remedy
in cases such as this because the state court has expressly held that § 1983 suits may be brought
in state court. Id.
144. See supra note 30.
145. The concurring opinion in Fair Assessment maintained that the majority had "renounce[d]
jurisdiction over an entire class of damages actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983."
454 U.S. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring).
146. The majority in Fair Assessment explained in a footnote that although the adequacy
of the state remedy was not an issue in the case, the remedy must be "plain, speedy, and
efficient" as interpreted from the Tax Injunction Act. Id. at 116 n.8. As long as plaintiffs'
federal rights will not be lost by seeking a state remedy, they should be required to exhaust
such remedies. The Court further explained that "numerous federal decisions have treated the
adequacy of state remedies, and it is to that body of law that federal courts should look in
seeking to determine the occasions for the comity spoken of today." Id.
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legislative history indicates federal courts should not trust a state agency
to uphold federal rights.' 7
The rigid no-exhaustion rule established in Patsy is questionable in light
of Fair Assessment. It can be argued that the inconsistency between the two
decisions is based solely on the Court's interpretation of congressional in-
tent to prohibit the federal judiciary from interfering in state taxation.''
As noted in Fair Assessment, the important nature of state revenue collec-
tion systems traditionally has counselled against federal court involvement
in state tax matters.'" There are areas other than state taxation, however,
in which the Supreme Court has determined that state remedies must be
exhausted before a plaintiff's section 1983 claim will be heard in federal
court.' ° The reasoning underlying these decisions, like that in Fair Assess-
ment, conflicts with the Patsy Court's suggestion that states cannot be trusted
to uphold federal rights.
As the Court in Patsy explained, the legislature, with its vast data collect-
ing abilities, possesses superior competence to determine which situations war-
rant the exhaustion requirement.'' As evidenced by the legislative histories
presented in Patsy, however, the legislature often does not expressly decide
the exhaustion question.'5 2 Therefore, where Congress has not confronted
the issue, the responsibility to determine whether exhaustion should be re-
quired appropriately lies with the judiciary.
Relying on the ambiguous legislative histories of section 1983 and section
1997e, however, the Patsy majority avoided judicial determination of the
relevant policy issues. No reasoning emerged from the Court's opinion which
explains why a state's administrative procedures should not be trusted to
decide employment discrimination claims, yet should be trusted to uphold
the federal rights of the taxpayer. If the Supreme Court had held that the
traditional exhaustion doctrine applied in all cases brought under section 1983,
plaintiffs only would have been required to exhaust those remedies which
were judicially determined to be adequate. "' Simultaneously, states would
have been assured that plaintiffs could not circumvent adequate administrative
remedies.
147. See supra notes 75-91 and accompanying text.
148. See generally The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARV. L. REv. 62, 213-14 (1982)
(discussing the Fair Assessment concurrence and its suggestion that Congress intended the ex-
haustion doctrine to govern § 1983 actions raising questions of state tax administration).
149. In Fair Assessment, the Court explained that it has recognized the "important and sen-
sitive nature of state tax systems and the need for federal court restraint when deciding cases
that affect such systems." 454 U.S. at 102. The Court further explained that Congress also
has recognized that "the autonomy and fiscal stability of the states survive best when state
tax systems are not subject to scrutiny in federal courts." Id. at 102-03.
150. See supra notes 111, 133-38 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
152. For a discussion of ambiguous legislative histories of § 1983 and § 1997, see supra notes
108-39 and accompanying text.
153. See generally Exhaustion in Section 1983 Cases, supra note 17, at 549 (rather than con-
sider the nature of the right asserted, the Court should consider the adequacy of the available
remedy when determining whether exhaustion should be required).
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Although courts eventually may carve out areas in addition to state tax
assessment in which exhaustion will be required under section 1983,' s' the
rigid no-exhaustion rule established in Patsy precludes federal courts from
considering the adequacy of an available state administrative remedy. Adverse
ramifications which may ensue as a result of this preclusion were addressed
by Congress when passing the limited exhaustion requirement of section
1997e. First, states may be discouraged from continuing to develop and im-
prove administrative systems if their agencies can be circumvented.' 5 Second,
the expertise of administrative officials may not be utilized.' 56 Moreover,
if states are not encouraged to develop adequate grievance procedures, sec-
tion 1983 plaintiffs may be denied the benefit of a quick resolution of their
disputes and, instead, be forced to seek redress in already overburdened
federal courts.'
Prior to Patsy, section 1983 actions constituted a large percentage of the
federal court caseload.' 8 Courts which previously applied the traditional ex-
haustion doctrine to section 1983 actions, however, no longer have the discre-
tion to require exhaustion of adequate state administrative remedies. Conse-
quently, the Patsy decision will cause an increase in the number of section
1983 actions heard by federal courts. The benefits derived from utilizing
state administrative agencies and conserving scarce judicial resources initial-
ly may not appear to outweigh a litigant's interest in immediate access to
federal court. As the Patsy Court recognized, however, Congress has ex-
pressed a deep concern about the capability of federal courts to handle the
increasing number of section 1983 actions.' 59 If the number of section 1983
actions brought in federal courts substantially increases as a result of the
decision in Patsy, it may be to the detriment of all federal court litigants.'60
154. See supra note 11l. See generally The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARV. L. REV.
62, 215 (1982) (persuasive considerations of policy may defeat the rigid no-exhaustion rule in
some § 1983 cases).
155. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
156. The expertise of agency officials may be of less import when a plaintiff's claim does
not raise questions about a state's regulatory schemes, but simply requires factual determina-
tions. Nonetheless, administrative officials who are familiar with state systems and who can
quickly hear evidence about the facts may be best equipped to decide the case. Cf. W.E.B.
DuBois Clubs of Am. v. Clark, 389 U.S. 309 (1967) (if factual determinations would aid court
in resolving constitutional dispute, exhaustion of federal administrative remedies is required).
Of course, federal judges can always decide the case de novo if the plaintiff remains dissatisfied
after state administrative procedures have been completed. See supra notes 29-30.
157. See supra note 133.
158. Subsequent to the decisions in Monroe and McNeese, § 1983 litigation has increased
dramatically. In 1961, about 270 suits were filed under the statute; but in 1981, the number
of civil suits filed under the statute had risen to 30,000. Powell, Are the Federal Courts Becoming
Bureaucracies?, 68 A.B.A. J. 1370, 1371 (1982).
159. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
160. Id. See 102 S. Ct. at 2577 (Powell, J., dissenting) (asserting that case load burden is
a detriment to all federal court litigants).
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CONCLUSION
Prior to the decision in Patsy, it had been argued that the Supreme Court
had not handed down a reasoned opinion considering whether it was ap-
propriate to require exhaustion of state administrative remedies as a prere-
quisite to section 1983 actions.'"' In Patsy, the Court again failed to delineate
judicial policy in support of its refusal to apply the traditional exhaustion
doctrine. Instead, the Court chose to base its decision primarily on the
equivocal legislative histories of both section 1983 and section 1997e. As
a result, no legitimate basis for adopting the rigid no-exhaustion rule was
established.
Notwithstanding whether the Court believed the relevant considerations
counselled for or against requiring exhaustion, the Patsy Court erred in not
relying on policy considerations. The traditional exhaustion doctrine is a rule
of judicial administration, and absent congressional mandate, it is the respon-
sibility of the judiciary to determine when the doctrine should be invoked.
Encouraging the development of adequate administrative remedies, utilizing
the expertise of agency officials, and conserving judicial resources are in-
terests in which federal courts always have a concern. In holding that ex-
haustion of adequate administrative remedies can never be required under
section 1983, the Patsy Court unwisely relied on ambiguous legislative history
rather than establish a sound policy rationale which would protect these
federal concerns. As a result, states will be discouraged from developing
administrative agencies which could aid in quick dispute resolution; and plain-
tiffs will be offered no alternative to the overburdened federal courts.
Lise Taylor Spacapan
161. For example, Kenneth C. Davis has stated that when a case is brought under § 1983,
"[alli reasoning about exhaustion . . . is dispensed with. . . . No matter what the reasons
may be for requiring exhaustion, the judicial fiat governs and exhaustion is not required."
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 20.01 (1976).
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